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Are countries better or worse off economically after receiving IMF loans?  Critics of this 
organization argue that its loans are harmful to countries in a variety of ways. The ways they 
argue its involvement is harmful include, most notably, the critiques of the debt spiral and 
conditionality. Proponents counter that the IMF accomplishes its goals of international economic 
stability through economic maintenance for lower income countries, which helps the countries in 
the long term (about 5 or more years out). This paper examines the IMF’s loans in several 
countries, ranging from low to high income from 1996-2020 and analyzes whether countries that 
received larger IMF loans were better off economically. I find that IMF loans create a “sugar 
rush” in countries, giving them momentary help and momentary relief, but contrary to the belief 
of proponents, not providing as much help in the long term. 
 
  
International Monetary Fund Involvement in Lower Income Countries:  
Helpful or Hurtful? 
 
The International Monetary Fund is an international organization that seeks to ensure the 
stability of the International Monetary System and the global economy. Created in the wake of 
World War II at the Bretton Woods Conference, they were created as an international lender of 
last resort – the financial institutions that countries could go to for financial assistance when no 
other lenders were capable or willing to help them out. This was seen as an important global 
economic safety feature, since countries defaulting on their loans would have a domino effect on 
global economy. Essentially, if one country goes down, it is possible that every country could get 
caught in a financial debt crisis.  The IMF seeks to promote financial stability in a number of 
ways: giving loans to countries that may be about to enter financial crises (lending), watching 
over member countries’ economies with economic surveillance, and “modernization” of 
countries’ policies and institutions with capacity development (IMF, 2020). To go about all this, 
they “regularly monitor global, regional, and national economic developments” (IMF, 2020).  
Prior to the collapse of fixed exchange rates in 1973, the IMF was less active in giving 
loans; now lending is one of its main pillars (Masters and Chatzky, 2020).  The International 
Monetary Fund gives out loans to countries in an effort to help those countries avoid financial 
crisis; ultimately to avoid a global financial collapse. Loan conditionality occurs when countries 
that take out loans are required to make significant economic reforms. Policies associated can 
include reduced government spending, cuts in funding to human capital (like hospitals and 
schools). 
Country governments typically go to the IMF when they are no longer capable of paying 
off debt or they are unable to continue funding foreign imports, both signs of a looming currency 
collapse (Masters and Chatzyky 2020).  Weiss (2010) explains that two main functions of the 
IMF are crisis control and surveillance of the global economy, and it has been named by some as 
a global “financial firefighter” (Economist 2011). Some scholars have argued that IMF loans 
have a positive impact on countries, with one recent study finding that countries who implement 
the IMF’s policies see an increase in average GDP growth rate (Hackler, Hefner, and Witte 
2020). 
However, critics have argued that the development policies required as part of receiving 
an IMF loan are especially onerous for low income countries (Stiglitz 2020), and citizens in 
some of these recipient countries do view their past loan experience in a very negative light. 
When I went to Jamaica in 2018, I met a local tour guide named Duka Brown. Duka argued that 
the massive loans from the IMF were not helpful for lower developed countries. In fact, the loans 
put the countries in awful situations, which included “debt spirals” and “conditionality”. He 
explained that the loans’ interest rates were so high that the IMF knew Jamaica would never be 
able to pay it, and that the majority of the money the country made off of tourism had to be 
immediately given back to the IMF. He also told me about how programs meant to fund 
hospitals and schools were cut, leaving only private hospitals for tourists and extremely 
dilapidated schools for children. He even showed us that the desks there in the school were from 
his time as a student.  
I seek to test whether IMF loans have positive impact on a country’s economy by 
examining a global dataset which includes countries who received IMF loans as well as ones that 
do not, and analyze both the short- and long-term growth rates of countries.  I test whether 
countries that take out larger loans have slower or faster growth than countries with smaller loans 
(or those with no loans at all). 
The Economic Role of a Financial Firefighter 
Typically, the main countries the IMF loans to are ones already heading towards financial 
collapse. IMF loans are intended to thwart and mitigate the effects of financial crises. But it is 
important to note the near state of collapse when evaluating IMF helpfulness, because the 
countries the IMF is trying to help are often in dismal situations at best. These crises the IMF 
intends to thwart include any temporary strain on a bank or group of banks, including but not 
limited to a collapse (Dobler, 2016). Countries can get into a variety of bad economic situations 
that lead to them seeking help from the IMF. These types of situations can include collapses in 
any of their economic sectors, local sicknesses crippling the workforce, war, or, in more recent 
circumstances, a global pandemic that crushes the economy worldwide. For example, Egypt 
recently requested a $4.8 billion loan because of their collapsing tourism and energy sectors 
(Fahim 2012). They then requested another loan this year in response to Covid-19 (APNews 
2020). While most IMF lending has been directed to low income countries, the IMF also played 
a major role in bailing out economies during the European debt crisis, such as Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, and Iceland (Masters and Chatzky 2020).  
While some countries go to the IMF when faced with a looming crisis, others might be 
using this organization as cover to put into place necessary but politically unpopular economic 
reforms.  A comparative case study by Vreeland (2002) on Uruguay found that Uruguay’s leader 
used IMF conditions to help counter domestic opposition that sought to block his proposed 
economic liberalization reforms. 
Even a country that wants but does not need an IMF loan, however, is likely facing 
economic trouble which requires reform.  In other words, even the “best case” scenario means 
that the IMF is lending to countries that are likely to be experiencing declining or weak 
economic growth. 
If we assume that IMF loan recipients start out in a poor financial situation, the next 
question is whether IMF loans ultimately help or hurt those countries, which is a hotly debated 
topic. Conway finds that the programs substantially raises economic growth and increase 
government surpluses (Conway 1994), but that the improvement in the economy occurs several 
years after they receive the loan, not immediately (Atoyan and Conway 2006). Essentially, the 
loans did not help the countries in real time but created improvements in economic growth 
several years down the line.   
Many studies find that the IMF is helpful because it accomplishes its core goals (like 
global economic stability and increasing countries’ reserves). Research like Dreher and Walter 
(2010), finds that IMF involvement significantly reduces the likelihood of a crisis through 
management of the global economy, and that the policy of currency devaluation can be helpful in 
mitigating macroeconomic risks long-term. Khan (1990) similarly finds a strong correlation 
between IMF involvement and macroeconomic stability as well as economic growth. The 
conditionality agreements that accompany IMF loans may also help these countries develop 
resilience, as countries who have had IMF help do undergo crises are more likely than countries 
without IMF help to adjust their exchange rate in response to the crisis (Dreher and Walter 
2010).  In other words, a recent study by Hackler, Hefner, and Witte finds that countries who 
implement the IMF’s policies see an increase in average GDP growth rate. IMF loan recipients 
become more financially adaptive and flexible following their loan, which puts them on better 
financial footing in the future (2020).  
In a recent case study, the IMF found that its loan recipients were better able to increase 
their international reserves and signs of debt (IMF 2019). Furthermore, the IMF article examines 
the effects its involvement has had in the lower developed country of Jamaica. Increases in net 
reserves and lowered public debt serve, in the eyes of the IMF, as two signs of progress in 
Jamaica. The article sees Jamaica as a total case of success. But a local source and the research 
of countless anti-IMF scholars suggests otherwise. Finally, Gylafson found that IMF 
involvement typically decreases a country’s debt and helps them pay off existing loans (1987). 
Which goes to show that lowering public debt and paying off existing loans just serve as signs of 
an IMF loan, not necessarily success or economic improvement in that country. 
Other scholars have a more mixed assessment of IMF lending. Eke and Kutan (2009) 
notes that each country has its “own characteristic in responding to the news [of IMF bailout],” 
and that the effectiveness of IMF loans may rest more on a recipient country’s commitment to 
reform, their current policies, and the presence or absence of external economic shocks.  
Similarly, a report by the IMF notes that loan effectiveness is limited by a persistently weak 
global economy (IMF Strategy, Policy, & Review Department 2019). 
  
Theory: The Main Criticisms of IMF Lending 
Critics, however, argue that IMF loans can be detrimental, especially to developing 
countries.  These scholars focus on the danger of debt spirals as well as the problems that can 
arise from loan conditionality.  One of the biggest problems associated with IMF loans is the 
debt spiral, which is the phenomenon that poor countries who take out IMF loans are unable to 
pay them back. They take out more loans when they are unable to pay existing loans, causing a 
government to lose money in interest instead of reinvesting money into their economies. Sachs 
(1997) remarked that the IMF’s policies can create a “rip-roaring economic downturn” in their 
attempts to solve currency crises. Perkins (2004) ruthlessly exposes how the debt spiral forces 
countries to extract resources from their economy instead of reinvest. While he worked in the 
private sector rather than a government or intergovernmental agency like the IMF, he explains 
how he took part in pressuring low development countries to say yes to loans that would only be 
able to be repaid through this exploitation of their natural resources. When countries’ institutions 
are too weak to use the loans to reinvest into their economy, they can get caught in the vicious 
cycle of a debt spiral, which has grave consequences for the country and global economy. 
Essentially they are forced to default on their loans and have to get out more loans to pay off 
previous ones, resulting in a cycle that is very hard for them to break.  
Greece is a recent example of this. Showcasing the perils of the debt spiral, Greece was in 
a state of crisis after having to default on multiple IMF loans. Having been a recipient of 
numerous loans over the years, it had to default on a 1.6-billion-euro loan in 2015. This left them 
in danger of a “Grexit” (McMurray, 2015). This is a perfect example of a country that thought 
IMF help would pose a solution, when it really created bigger problems by giving the country 
more loans than they could handle.  
 Stiglitz (2002)  argues that a lot of this issue of debt spiral relates to the “one-size fits 
all” nature of IMF loans and their resulting conditionalities.  He points out that, although the IMF 
does come through on many of their promises (crisis prevention, better trade, nominally better 
health care, amongst other things), it is still “not working for the world’s poor”. It is not 
responsive enough to the needs of the nations in which it is involved. In fact, the nature of 
conditionality is a major critique of IMF involvement. There are two main problems associated 
with conditionality: cutting of government funds and the way capital moves in and out of the 
country too freely. 
To help the markets, the IMF requires loan recipient countries cut government funds and 
revenue for programs like poverty reduction and human capital programs.  However, these 
welfare spending policies are often instrumental at helping a country improve their human 
capital. When the countries are unable to invest in reducing their poverty and improving human 
capital, they are left with sick, uneducated, and unproductive workforces, which in turn 
depresses their economic growth potential. A considerable literature has linked human capital to 
economic growth (for a small sample of this research, see Barro 2001 and Krebbs 2003), thus, 
any required cuts to these programs are also likely to undermine a country’s growth potential. 
And many times, IMF conditions also cut education, healthcare, and bureaucracy with 
few cuts  to a country’s military (IMF Conditionality). Dijkstra finds IMF involvement to be 
harmful in countries like Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Honduras, echoes the criticisms of 
conditionality by saying “that there [is] also limited country ownership with respect to the 
contents of the strategies” (2010, 451). 
A second harmful aspect of conditionality is that it makes it too easy for capital to move 
in and out. This can lead to risky investment and less oversight. While cutting bureaucratic red 
tape can allow local businesses to emerge, when there is too little oversight, this can trigger 
problematic boom and bust cycles (IMF 2019). IMF loan conditions are especially intended to 
help lure foreign investment, which can heighten this continual economic crisis risk for 
developing countries.  According to Best, “As developing countries have become more 
integrated into the global economy, they have become more vulnerable to sudden changes in 
exchange rates and capital movements—all of which can derail an IMF adjustment loan or a 
World Bank program” (2012, 679). 
While debt spirals and conditionality agreements can create problems for loan recipients, 
these criticisms at least assume the IMF actually successfully deploys a loan and establishes 
reform.  However, Eke & Kutan (2009) found that in Eastern European countries, the “IMF fails 
to meet its main objective of providing temporary assistance”, that “only 21% of the programs in 
transition economies… were successfully completed” (16).  As a result, “IMF programs do not 
influence GDP growth rates… in their desired directions” (22). The wealth of research on debt 
spiral and conditionality, in addition to my personal interview with a local Jamaican leads me to 
believe that these loans are not working. I therefore hypothesize that: 




To empirically test the aforementioned hypothesis, I conducted a cross national statistical 
analysis. My data set will include  all countries that the World Bank collects economic data on, 
and range from 1996-2020. For each year, I collect data on the GDP growth and IMF loan size 
for each country. I also include controls for human capital and corruption.  
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is whether a country sees positive or negative GDP growth from 
the countries given IMF loans. According to the IMF, GDP, or Gross Domestic Product,  
“measures the monetary value of final goods and services—that is, those that are bought by the 
final user—produced in a country in a given period of time (say a quarter or a year)” (IMF 
2020). GDP is a quintessential way to test whether or not low-income countries are experiencing 
the desired economic benefits of IMF help because higher values mean greater growth. “GDP is 
an accurate indicator of the size of an economy and the GDP growth rate is probably the single 
best indicator of economic growth” (Picardo 2020). 
Independent Variable 
My independent variable is the size of a country’s IMF loan, taken directly from the IMF 
website (IMF 2020). Linked under References, the website shows the loan year with members, 
dates, and amounts in US dollars. I collect this data for every year for every country that has 
received IMF help from 1996-2020.  Countries that received no IMF loans in a given year 
receives a 0.   
Control Variables 
 I will be using the information from the World Bank’s human capital index to control for 
human capital. This includes the “knowledge, skills, and health that people invest in and 
accumulate throughout their lives”. Human capital relates to the idea that a well-educated and 
healthy workforce would contribute more readily to a great economy than the opposite.  
 As Collier (2007) points out, poor governance is a major factor that can prevent a country 
from achieving stable economic growth.  For this reason, I will also be using the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators data from World Bank (World Bank 2020). It accounts for the following 
six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, political stability and 
absence of violence, rule of law, government effectiveness, and control of corruption (World 
Bank 2020). Similar to human capital, a country with less corruption, accountability, and rule of 
law in its government would be more able to readily make use of IMF loans, while a country 
with more corruption or less accountability might more quickly misuse and or funnel the money 
elsewhere. We are controlling for these elements to give a fair shake to the IMF and 
acknowledge that these countries were not in ideal shape in the first place in several aspects.  
 Finally, since high and low income countries have different potential growth trajectories, 
I coded two dichotomous variables to identify whether a country is for high-income or low-
income.  This classification is based on to the World Bank’s definition (World Bank 2020). 
Statistical Analysis 
 I downloaded all this data into Stata and created separate spreadsheets for each variable. 
Since IMF loans are likely to take a while to go into effect, I lagged my dependent variable by 1 
year and by 5 years to see whether a previous IMF loan help or hurt future growth rates. Since 
my dependent variable is pretty much continuous, I use an OLS regression to analyze the data.  
 
Results 
 After doing the regression in Stata, I find that my results for the lag after one year were 
significant, just not in the direction I had anticipated. The results showed that the loans not only 
do not immediately hurt the countries, instead they actually help the countries after that first 
year. Since IMF loans are a sudden influx of financial capital, which may help stimulate the 
economy in the short term, this seems to make sense. The loans help the countries a year later 
because loans help in the short term, but often contribute to long term difficulties. 
Table 1: Country growth rate at different time periods 
(OLS Regression) 
 GDP Growth 
1 year out 
GDP Growth 
5 years out 
































F 14.40*** 11.86*** 
R-Squared 0.046 0.05 
Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered on country in parenthesis *p < .10, **p<.05, 
***p<.01 
 
However, it is important to note that they don’t necessarily help the countries long term. 
In the 5-year results, we did not see the IMF loan size benefitting the countries.  While it is good 
to be hesitant about discussing a null finding, it may be that IMF loans provide something like a 
“sugar rush” for the countries; loans have a small short-term impact with less evidence of a long-
term impact. It helps in the moment, but it seems that the results are lost before we get a chance 
to see a local impact, which could help explain the effect on Duka in Montego Bay. 
Ultimately, it seems that other factors are probably more important to helping these 
countries.  Lower human development seems to reduce growth rates, which does run counter to 
traditional human capital arguments.  However, it could be that this variable is highly correlated 
with country income level, since countries with higher income levels tend to also have high HDI 
ratings.  This correlation could be confusing the analysis.  Similarly, the results suggest a 
surprising finding that better rule of law also reduces GDP growth go down. Again, this could be 
correlated with country income level, as high income countries also tend to have better rule of 
law.    
Conclusion: Directions for Future Research 
Perhaps it is not the amount, but the type of loan and the structural adjustment that is a 
more important part of the story. The conditions they are expected to follow post loan reception 
could be significant. Future research should consider the nuances instead of just analyze the 
money. Researching things like the conditionality of a loan and or loan type could reveal more 
than loan size did. One thing to consider in why we see short term growth is the possibility that 
these are countries that would have seen slow growth even without the IMF’s involvement. It 
may just be that the countries have deeper seated issues. But, to be clear, the loans themselves do 
not seem to be doing any direct damage. 
It could be that some loans are more beneficial than others. This is why I suggest that 
future projects look at what the loans consisted of rather than the amount. There are three 
different types of loans that the IMF gives out: Extended Credit, Rapid Credit, and Standby 
Credit. It could be that some loans help certain types of countries more effectively.  
As previously stated, it could be that it is innate factors in the countries causing a lack of GDP 
growth. A deep dive into the similar aspects (beyond being lower development countries) that 
these poorer countries share could also shed some light onto why we see this phenomenon of 
stunted growth.  
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